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On the morning of September 11, 2001, I stepped out the door of my
apartment building and witnessed Armageddon. I live only four blocks from
the World Trade Center, and I stood-stunned-as flames licked the side of
the North Tower. As I made my way to the site, against the crowds fleeing
through the narrow streets, I waded through the ash and cinder that blan-
keted downtown Manhattan like an out-of-season snow; and I watched in
horror as people chose to plummet to the earth rather than await their certain
death in the raging inferno.
I have spent much of my career in international law working in the de-
veloping world, and I am no stranger to war-torn zones. I was a member of
the first international judicial delegation into Tuzla after the Dayton Ac-
cords.' And I traveled to Nairobi on a mission sponsored by the U.S. Agency
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for the Global Economy," held November 14-16, 2002, in San Diego, California, and spon-
sored by California Western School of Law, together with co-sponsors the International Bar
and the American Branch of the International Law Association. The November 2002 Rule of
Law conference was the inaugural event to be funded by the Dean Emeritus and Professor
Robert K. Castetter and Marjorie B. Castetter Endowment Fund.
* The Honorable Delissa A. Ridgway is a Judge on the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Peng
Tan (J.D. 2003, Columbia University School of Law).
** Mariya A. Talib (J.D. 2001, George Washington University Law School) is one of
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1. The Dayton Peace Agreement-known as the Dayton Accords-was initialed at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris
on December 14, 1995 by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. The Accords
sought to end ethnic and religious conflict in the region by establishing a unified country,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of two multi-ethnic regions, the BH Federation and the
Republika Srpska. Id.
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for International Development just weeks after the Embassy bombings
there.2 But the events of 9/11 were different. In the most literal sense of the
words, the events of 9/11 "hit home."
The symbolism and the irony of the tragedy were striking. In essence,
the terrorists turned globalization against itself, mounting an attack planned
via the Internet, fueled by electronic funds transfers, coordinated via cell
phone, and executed using two commercial U.S. jets-the wings of global-
ization-hijacked by immigrant extremists to reduce to rubble the iconic
World Trade Center (the very symbol of U.S. economic power), and to bring
Wall Street (a key cradle of globalization) to its knees, killing some 2,800
people from more than sixty countries in the process.' Paradoxically, the
very forces that drive globalization-transportation, information and com-
munication technologies-were marshaled by opponents of globalization, in
an effort to destroy it.
4
In the poetic words of one thoughtful observer, "globalization means the
terrible nearness of distant places."5 Terrorism is the truly dark side of glob-
alization. The New Yorker magazine has offered up its own, darkly comic
take on the phenomenon. A cartoon published barely one month before 9/11
depicts two businessmen in a bar.6 And one says to the other: "Look, I've got
nothing against globalization, just as long as it's not in my backyard."7
Of course, everyday events in the world paint a much more vibrant pic-
ture of the phenomenon. One recent article in the Financial Times opened
with thumbnail sketches of: Lucio Garcia, a gardener in Virginia who speaks
daily to his family in a remote Bolivian town, using a prepaid phone card
that costs him a few cents a minute; Edie Baron Levi, a Mexican congress-
man who commutes weekly from Mexico City to Los Angeles, where he and
his constituents live; and Iqbal Farouqi, a Pakistani waiter who works in Mi-
lan, saving his tips to buy trucks in Karachi, which he rents to relatives and
2. On August 7, 1998, bombs leveled the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania. Prosecutors Tied Defendants to bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at
B10. Two hundred twelve Kenyans and twelve U.S. citizens perished in the Nairobi incident.
Id. Four followers of Osama bin Laden were later sentenced to life in prison for their role in
the bombings.
3. See Linda Williamson, Living With Pain: New Yorkers "Vigilant But Defiant,"
TORONTO SUN, Sept. 11, 2002, at 2 (reporting number and nationality of World Trade Center
victims).
4. In another ironic twist, two of the most ubiquitous symbols of American-style capital-
ism and favored targets of anti-globalization activists-McDonald's and Starbucks-played
significant roles in the post-9/ll search, rescue and recovery efforts. The neighborhood
McDonald's was one of the first sites commandeered to help feed emergency workers, and
"my" Starbucks was closed for months while it was used as a relief center.
5. Okwui Enwezor (Artistic Director of Documenta 11, the latest edition of what is often
called "the Olympics of contemporary art," held every five years in Kassel, Germany), quoted
in Peter Plagens, Doubts at Documenta, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 2002, at 84.
6. See NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2001, at 4.
7. Id.
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manages over the Internet.' Globalization has made it possible for people in
one country to be involved in the day-to-day cultural, economic and political
affairs of other countries. And with it comes the need for a new world order.
The old paradigms no longer suffice, as September 11 th proved. More
and more, it is rogue forces, such as Al Qaeda-not sovereign states-who
wield power. Or, to put it another way, Al Qaeda is a virtual state. As one
commentator has observed:
"[Al Qaeda has a] standing army, a Treasury, a consistent source of reve-
nue, a civil service, and an intelligence corps. It even runs a rudimentary
welfare program for its fighters and their relatives and associates." It de-
clared war on the U.S. in 1995; and, as at the time of Pearl Harbor, the
U.S. faces "death and destruction on a scale associated with war." 9
Framed in that fashion, Al Qaeda does indeed sound like a state.
National boundaries and notions of territoriality are increasingly mean-
ingless-irrelevant given economic integration and the accelerating move-
ment of people, capital, goods and services, information, and ideas across
invisible (and increasingly porous) geographic borders.'" Problems that once
were purely national now have a clearly international dimension. Many of
these so-called "problems without passports" cannot be solved by a national-
only approach, or even a bilateral, nation-to-nation approach." While it may
be premature to proclaim its demise, the nation/state is increasingly a flawed
agent for cross-border bargains. A firm based in the U.S., for example, may
"raise[ ] capital from Japanese pension funds and Belgian dentists, ... oper-
ate[ ] subsidiaries in China and Chile,. . . employ[ ] people of all faiths and
cultures, and... compete[ J globally .... "" Yet national lawmakers and
regulators of the world around still, naturally, tend to focus narrowly on the
territory within their boundaries. Even now, each nation/state generally acts
only in its own interests, and typically with only the short term in mind.'
Even as individuals, we still tend to think locally, even as we inadver-
tently act globally. By spraying myself with antiperspirant in my apartment
in New York every morning, I may be contributing to skin cancer deaths,
8. Moises Naim, The Diaspora That Fuels Development, FIN. TIMES (2d ed., U.S.), June
10, 2002, at 13.
9. Samuel Brittan, The U.S. is More Nearly Right, FIN. TIMES (1st ed., London), Aug. 1,
2002, at 15 (quoting Philip Bobbit, The First Terrorist War of the World, FIN. TIMES (1st ed.,
London), July 13, 2002, at 2).
10. But see Martin Wolf, Location, Location, Location Equals the Wealth of Nations,
FIN. TnMEs (2d ed., London), Sept. 25, 2002, at 23 (arguing that, in another sense, "[b]orders
have never mattered so much. Two or three centuries ago, the most important determinant of
most people's fate was the class into which they were born, closely followed by their sex. To-
day, where one is born matters far more" than class or sex; and that "a large proportion of
humanity find[s] itself locked inside bad locations with poor policies and worse govern-
ance.").
11. John Ruggie, Managing Corporate Social Responsibility, FIN. TIMES (2d ed., U.S.),
Oct. 25, 2002, at 13 (referring to "proliferating 'problems without passports"').
12. Capitalism and Conscience, WASH. POST, July 10, 2002, at A16.
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years from now, in some remote village in Brazil.'3 It is a haunting spectre:
nation/states, each huddled within its own borders, leaving the world's most
harrowing problems "orphaned": AIDS, climate change, drug trafficking,
money laundering and terrorism, to name but a few. 4
Of course, all that is changing. To be sure, the number of nation/states
has soared in recent decades. But recent years have also witnessed a dra-
matic proliferation of multilateral organizations and institutions to which
those nation/states are relinquishing defining elements of their sovereignty:
authority over the use of force, over economic and social policy-making, and
over their own environmental resources.
Moreover, these supranational organizations and institutions are not the
only forces to which the world's nation/states are ceding power. The role of
multinational corporations iis being re-conceived as well. Today, twenty-
nine of the world's 100 largest economic entities are multinational compa-
nies.' The leader of the pack is Exxon, which is larger than all but forty-four
national economies.' 6 Exxon is about the same size as the economy of Paki-
stan, and larger than Peru." Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, General Electric and
Toyota are all comparable in size to the economy of Nigeria. Phillip Mor-
ris is akin to Tunisia, Slovakia and Guatemala, while BP, Wal-Mart, IBM
and Volkswagen all rank in size between Libya and Cuba.' 9 Pharmaceuticals
giant GlaxoSmithKline and BT, the smallest of the top 100 multinationals,
are equal in size to Syria." Around the globe-but particularly in the devel-
oping world-multinational corporations have begun to assume some of the
functions traditionally reserved to nation/states ... states whose economies
they often dwarf.'
And then there is the rise of civil society: public policy think tanks, in-
dependent media, trade unions, and other non-profit organizations and vol-
untary associations dedicated to civic, cultural, humanitarian, and social
13. A recent campaign promoting Economist magazine makes the point rather more lyri-
cally (and affirmatively): "When a butterfly flutters its wings in one part of the world, it can
eventually cause a hurricane in another." (copy on file with California Western International
Law Journal).
14. (Citing "[b]iological weapons proliferation, global warming, and rapidly accelerating
biodiversity loss" as some of the more pressing issues on the "global to-do list," one analyst
recently warned that "future historians may see in the glacial pace of diplomacy during the
early twenty-first century not merely failures of collective action but symptoms of collective
denial."). See P.J. Simmons, Global Challenges: Beating the Odds, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT'L PEACE (Policy Brief No. 17), Aug. 2002, at 1.
15. Guy de Jonquiyres, Companies "Bigger Than Many Nations," FIN. TIMES (1st ed.,
London), Aug. 13, 2002, at 7 (reporting data compiled and released by the U.N. Conference
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causes. Who can doubt the power of organizations like Amnesty Interna-
tional? Greenpeace? Oxfam? The International Committee of the Red Cross?
They have earned, and demanded, a place at the table, and now operate as an
independent international force."
The waning power of the sovereign nation/state-and its replacement by
a multiplicity of structures and institutions that share in political, economic
and legal authority-heralds a new era. 3 Familiar concepts of municipal and
international law are yielding to an emerging international legal pluralism. In
more and more instances, no one entity has the sort of legal authority that
has traditionally been the hallmark of sovereign states. It is, indeed, a brave
new world of global governance, with a whole new cast of players.
That brave new world was perhaps most recently in evidence at the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in late
August and early September 2002 . The focus of Johannesburg was on end-
ing poverty; and the consensus there was that aid, trade and foreign direct
investment are the way forward; and that nation/states, multilateral institu-
tions, multinational corporations and civil society all have integral roles to
play.25
One of the more intriguing aspects of the Johannesburg dialogue was
the emphasis on "partnerships," and the "morphing" role of multinational
corporations. 6 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan first garnered worldwide
22. Indeed, the increasingly popular mainstream status of civil society was confirmed
when Vanity Fair magazine, in its December 2002 "Hall of Fame" issue, featured a glossy
two-page photo spread recognizing "World Nongovernmental-Organization Leaders," includ-
ing top executives of the International Rescue Committee, Human Rights Watch, the Interna-
tional Crisis Group, the Open Society Institute, the Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, CARE,
Amnesty International, and Save the Children. World Nongovernmental-Organization Lead-
ers, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2002, at 321 (photographed by Jonas Karlsson).
23. Although the status of nation/states may, in many respects, be in decline, they now
have their own game. Launched in late 2002 by 29-year old Australian author Max Berry, Na-
tionStates is an online government-simulation game (www.nationstates.net) in which players
create and rule their own countries in accordance with their personal beliefs. The game is
based on Jennifer Government, Barry's satirical novel set in an ultra-privatized world run by
giant U.S. corporations, where taxes are illegal and employees assume the last names of their
employers. See Leslie Walker, NationStates, the Game, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2003, at H6.
24. Hope Versus Experience, FIN. TIMES (2d ed.,London), Aug. 24, 2002, at 8 [hereinaf-
ter Hope]; Doing Business in Johannesburg, FIN. TmIES (1st ed., London), Aug. 29, 2002, at
18 [hereinafter Doing Business].
25. See Hope, supra note 24, at 8 (noting place of aid, trade and investment on Summit
agenda); Doing Business, supra note 24, at 18 (noting that "[tihe big idea at Johannesburg
is... promoting collaboration between companies, governments and NGOs rather than sterile
action plans for governments.").
26. James Lamont, Companies Court Partners Among World's Poor, FIN. TIMEs (1 st ed.,
London), Aug. 29, 2002, at 7 (reporting that the "buzzword echoing in the corridors" at Jo-
hannesburg was "partnership"--specifically, "development partnerships between companies,
governments and civil society."); James Lamont & Alan Beattie, Don't Rely on Business, UN
Warns, FIN. TimES (1st ed., London), Sept. 4, 2002, at 9 (noting that "[a]t Johannesburg, com-
panies have emerged-with encouragement from Kofi Annan, UN secretary-general-as ve-
hicles to bring development to poor people in small-scale partnerships.").
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headlines on those topics in January 1999, when he used the World Eco-
nomic Forum in Davos as his platform to warn of an impending backlash
against globalization and to deliver an impassioned appeal focusing on the
principles underpinning the burgeoning "Corporate Social Responsibility"/
"Sustainable Development" movement. 7 Three of the issues identified in the
Secretary General's remarks-human rights, labor standards, and environ-
mental protection-are at the heart of the Corporate Social Responsibility
movement. 2' The Secretary General's thesis was straight-forward: The wide-
spread adoption of high standards in the business world should result in a
global environment maximizing free trade and ensuring open markets-with
multinational corporations both Doing Well and Doing Good.29
Some of the more high profile champions of good corporate citizenship
are global giants that have weathered public relations crises in the past. For
example, stung by worldwide criticism of its cozy relations with Nigeria's
military government (which hanged human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa
and other opponents in 1995), Shell opened a dialogue with human rights
groups and incorporated respect for human rights into its official corporate
business principles. 0 In addition, Shell established a new policy requiring
the heads of its 100-plus subsidiaries to submit periodic written reports on
actions taken to meet human rights, social and environmental goals.31 Simi-
larly, news reports of Nike's use of sweatshop factories in Southeast Asia
ignited firestorms of consumer, investor and labor rights protests, damaging
the Nike brand. Multinational corporations have learned the hard way that
socially responsible conduct pays dividends many times over in savings of
management time, brand reputation, and consumer loyalty that can be de-
stroyed in a single high-profile negative incident. 3
Nor are the potential benefits of corporate social responsibility limited
to cost avoidance. Some corporations-such as the textbook example, the
retailer Body Shop-have sought to make their socially responsible conduct
itself a competitive advantage, working to build brand loyalty on their
pledges of socially responsible operations."' Further, socially responsible
conduct may not only enhance consumer loyalty; it may also give a corpora-
tion a competitive edge in the labor market, helping to recruit and retain a
27. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, An Appeal to World Business, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1999, at A15; Annan Calls on Firms to Put "Human Face" on Globalization,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 31, 1999 (Financial Pages).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Christopher Swann, Little Brother is Watching, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), June 1999, at
18 (Special Supplement: Responsible Business).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 18-19.
33. Id. at 18.
34. See Geoffrey Heal, The Bottom Line to a Social Conscience, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), July
2, 2001, at 6 (Survey: Mastering Investment).
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pool of talented employees.35 As a senior officer of BP recently observed,
"All employees want to feel good about what they do.' 36
Yet another potential benefit (at least in the eyes of multinational corpo-
rations) is the possibility that self-regulation may stave off government or
other regulation of corporate conduct. 37 And, as a Conference Board report
concluded, "egregiously poor corporate citizenship which invites regulatory
or legal sanction has negative consequences for shareholders."38
Perhaps the greatest potential benefit of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, though, is that cited by the U.N. Secretary General, and echoed by World
Bank President James Wolfensohn (among others): a global environment
maximizing free trade and an environment of open and stable markets
worldwide.39
There is, of course, a price tag attached to Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity. Even if the U.N. Secretary General is right about the long term benefits
of social responsibility (such as open markets and free trade), corporations
that adhere to rigorous standards in their global operations may find them-
selves at a short-term disadvantage vis-ai-vis competitors that exploit child
labor, pollute the environment, and bribe public officials to win contracts.4 0
35. See, e.g., Alison Maitland, Bitter Taste of Success, FIN. TnMEs (1st ed., London), Mar.
11, 2002, at 14 (noting Starbucks internal surveys show that the company's corporate social
responsibility record is a major factor in personnel retention, and that reducing the turnover
rate of "barista" employees by one percentage point adds $100,000 a year to the company's
bottom line).
36. Kate Burgess, Power of the Individual, FiN. TIMES (U.S.), Oct. 22, 2001, at 6 (Special
Supplement: Responsible Business).
37. See generally Maria Livanos Cattaui (Secretary General of the International Chamber
of Commerce), Code of Conduct Will Turn Clock Back, FIN. TIMES (2d ed., U.S.), July 21,
1999, at 12; Alison Maitland & Michael Mann, Challenge to a Voluntary Preserve, FN.
TnMEs (1st ed., London), May 30, 2002, at 14 (discussing business opposition to government-
mandated reporting of corporations' social and environmental performance). But see Andrew
Balls & Quentin Peel, Callfor Rules on Global Integration, FIN. TIMEs (1st ed., London), July
12, 1999, at 4 (discussing U.N. Development Programme's 1999 Human Development Re-
port, which urged "[tlougher rules on global governance, including principles of performance
for multinationals on labour standards, fair trade and environmental protection.").
38. Kevin Brown, Growing Legal Complexities Make Competence an Issue: Directors'
Qualifications, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Oct. 1, 1999, at 6 (Survey: FT Director).
39. See, e.g., Call for Social Responsibility, FN. TIMEs (1st ed., U.S.), Nov. 8, 2002, at 7
(reporting on Wolfensohn speech to TransAtlantic Business Dialogue, in which he stated,
"Social responsibility is not a question of charity, it's a question of enlightened self-
interest.").
40. For similar reasons, the developing world is not universal in its embrace of Corporate
Social Responsibility. Some representatives of less developed countries may not welcome
stringent labor, environmental and human rights standards. They may view cheap labor and
lax environmental regulation as their competitive advantage in a global marketplace. See gen-
erally Bernard Wasow, Good Intentions That Prolong Poverty, FIN. TIMES (lst ed., U.S.),
Apr. 20, 2000, at 13 (noting the fierce opposition of governments in some developing coun-
tries to strengthening labor standards, out of concern that labor rights campaigns "only serve
the interests of workers in rich countries that fear competition from cheap foreign labour");
Richard Tomkins, When Caring is a Good Investment, FIN. TIMES (2d ed., London), Oct. 5,
2001, at 15 (noting that "[flor example, forcing western labour standards on factories in de-
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Moreover, the Corporate Social Responsibility movement has poten-
tially profound ramifications for nation/states, their functions, and their sov-
ereignty.' Some corporate usurpation of what have traditionally been con-
sidered public functions seems to be inherent. 2 Whether that is a good thing
or a bad thing is open to debate. Secretary General Annan spoke to that point
when he framed the issue in Johannesburg, concluding that "[g]overnments
cannot do the job alone."43 But, he continued, "[wle are not asking corpora-
tions to do something different from their normal business; we are asking
them to do their normal business differently.""
Although it makes for a snappy soundbite, the second half of the Secre-
tary General's formulation is at least as debatable as the first, as some claim
that Corporate Social Responsibility reflects a dangerous blurring of the
roles of corporations and nation/states alike. Invoking Nobel Prize-winning
economist Milton Friedman, who wrote that "the social responsibility of a
business is to make a profit,"45 some critics of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity argue that a corporation's assumption of responsibility for the health care
or education of a developing country's citizenry represents at least as much a
perversion of the corporation's function as it does an abdication of responsi-
bility by the state. 6
veloping countries can backfire by reducing investment and job creation. And meeting unjus-
tifiably alarmist concerns about the environment imposes extra responsibilities and heavy
costs on businesses, limiting competition and economic development.").
41. See Alan Beattie et al., Business Resists New Partnerships 'Solution,' FIN. TMEts (1st
ed., London), Aug. 27, 2002, at 10.
42. Id. (noting NGO skepticism of "private sector solutions to complex economic prob-
lems," and U.N. statements recognizing that "[p]artnerships are not a substitute for govern-
ment action or responsibilities").
43. Genevieve Tremblay, Taking the Pulse of the World Summit, SUSTAIN, Nov. 2002
(quarterly newsletter of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development) (emphasis
added).
44. Id. See also U.N. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, A Word to the Wise, WASH. POST,
Sept. 2, 2002, at A23.
45. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32.
46. The charges leveled by these critics go well beyond the assertion that the embrace of
Corporate Social Responsibility effectively constitutes a repudiation of fundamental princi-
ples of free market economics. Reviewing one of the more thoughtful (and damning) cri-
tiques, the Economist noted that the critique's author-David Henderson (the former chief
economist of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development):
is not content to argue... that the new commitment to corporate social responsi-
bility is a sham .... Still less is he willing to argue that paying lip-service to cor-
porate social responsibility may actually do some social good-albeit less than its
more enthusiastic supporters would advocate. [He] claims, rather, that the fad for
corporate social responsibility is doing real harm. The appropriate response, in his
view, is not to laugh at it or tolerate it, but to recognise it for the danger it is and
oppose it.... [T]he problem, Mr. Henderson emphasizes, is not merely that the fad
for corporate social responsibility is intellectually wrong, or that it poisons opinion
against market capitalism. It also promotes policies that are directly welfare-
reducing.... In seeking a level regulatory playing-field based on their ethical in-
8
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So those are the players-nation/states, multilateral organizations, mul-
tinational corporations, and civil society. What about the means-the trium-
virate ... trade, aid and investment?"7
Bashing foreign aid has been much in vogue in certain Washington cir-
cles in recent years. 8 True enough, foreign aid has been plagued with prob-
lems. '9 Foreign policy and politics distort the destination of aid, diverting
funds from the truly needy.5" And too many foreign aid dollars actually stay
sights, rich-country "good global citizens" limit competition, worsening the per-
formance of the global economy as a whole and putting developing countries at a
particular disadvantage.
Curse of the Ethical Executive, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001, at 70 (reviewing DAVID
HENDERSON, MISGUIDED VIRTUE: FALSE NOTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Inst. of Econ. Aff., Hobart Paper 142, 2001). See also Martin Wolf, Sleep-walking With the
Enemy, FIN. TIMES (Ist ed., London), May 16, 2001, at 21 (also reviewing Misguided Virtue).
47. Debt forgiveness is a key fourth element of alleviating poverty. In recent years, Brit-
ish rockers Radiohead, and Bono (the lead singer of U2), have done for debt forgiveness what
Princess Diana did for landmines. Their Republican colleagues in the White House and on
Capitol Hill were quite bemused by the sight of Bono squiring then-Secretary of the Treasury
Paul O'Neill around Africa, and whispering in then-Senator Jesse Helms' ear. See Ed Crooks,
Radiohead Rock the Boat Over Global Trade Rules, FIN. TIMES (2d ed., London), June 19,
2002, at 5 (noting Radiohead lead singer Thom Yorke's involvement in the Jubilee 2000
campaign for debt relief); Of Celebrities, Charities and Trade, ECONOMIST, June 1, 2002, at
68 (noting Bono's role as a champion of debt relief as part of the Jubilee 2000 campaign). See
also Alan Beattie, Twelve Days to See Where the Money Goes: Paul O'Neill, U.S. Treasury
Secretary, and Bono, Musician and Aid Activist, Begin a Trip to Africa Today, FIN. TIMES (1st
ed., London), May 20, 2002, at 8. High levels of unsustainable debt are a major impediment
to growth in many developing economies, particularly in Africa. Debt relief is particularly
attractive as an engine of economic growth, because it avoids some of the problems associ-
ated with development lending in years past, including conflicting obligations imposed by
different lenders. Moreover, because it improves poor countries' finances, debt relief may en-
courage the private sector to risk capital there, preferably in the form of direct investment. See
Creditors, Cough Up, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at A26.
48. For a very readable account of the history of foreign aid, see John Cassidy, Helping
Hands: How Foreign Aid Could Benefit Everybody, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60
[hereinafter Helping Hands]. Cassidy aptly notes:
The international aid agencies tend to be criticized whatever they do. On the left,
critics accuse them of carrying out the free-market agendas of multinational corpo-
rations and the United States government to the detriment of poor countries. On
the right, critics.., accuse them of throwing good money after bad at corrupt and
incompetent regimes. In fact, the aid agencies are staffed with apolitical profes-
sionals who try to do their best in difficult circumstances.
Id. at 66.
49. See Michael Dobbs, Foreign Aid Shrinks, But Not For All, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2001, at Al [hereinafter Foreign Aid Shrinks]; Michael Dobbs, Investment in Freedom is
Flush With Peril, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2001, at A l; Michael Dobbs, Aid Abroad is Business
Back Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Aid Abroad].
50. Hugely disproportionate sums are sent each year to the Middle East-Israel, Egypt,
Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza-which receives much more U.S. aid than any other re-
gion, even though it is by no means the poorest part of the world. The United States is thus
"one of the biggest offenders when it comes to doling out aid according to political priorities,
rather than directing it to where it will be best used." Helping Hands, supra note 48, at 65. See
also Foreign Aid Shrinks, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2001, at Al.
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in U.S. hands, paid out to U.S. companies who deliver food, medical sup-
plies and other assistance abroad, under contract to the federal government."
But a recent World Bank analysis suggests that criticisms of the effec-
tiveness of foreign aid are overblown-and, in fact, that aid can be effective
in any country where it is supported by sound economic policies. 2 Accord-
ing to that analysis, "[b]etween 1970 and 1993, developing countries with
good economic policies but low aid payments grew at an annual rate of 2.2
percent per capita, whereas developing countries with good economic poli-
cies and high aid payments grew almost twice as fast."53 Yet, as important as
foreign aid is, the reality is that trade and investment account for 80% of the
money available for development."' Trade and investment are therefore far
greater sources of funds for development than foreign aid will ever be.
In a phrase, trade dwarfs aid. The U.S. alone imports more than $450
billion in products from the developing world every year-more than eight
times the amount that developing countries receive in aid from all sources.5
International trade is thus a vital engine for poverty-reducing growth. Trade
liberalization is one of the few policies that virtually all economists can
agree on.56 It creates wealth. It reduces poverty. It is a zero-sum game. The
countries of the world that have intensified their links with the global econ-
omy through trade have tended to grow more rapidly over a sustained pe-
riod, and have experienced greater reductions in poverty. The evidence is
quite clear. While, at low levels, globalization often appears to hurt the poor,
beyond a certain threshold, it does indeed reduce poverty.57 In other words,
when globalization hurts the poor, it is not because it has gone too far, but
rather, because it has not gone far enough." Hence, the slogan: Trade, not
aid.
51. See Aid Abroad, supra note 49, at Al. A recent article in the Washington Post re-
ported that:
The U.S. Agency for International Development's Web site has boasted, scandal-
ously, that close to 80 percent of its contracts and grants goes directly to American
firms. If the Bush administration is serious about wanting to make aid effective, it
must free poor countries to spend aid dollars on the most efficient suppliers-
including suppliers who themselves come from poor countries.
Rethinking Foreign Aid, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2002, at A 16.
52. Helping Hands, supra note 48, at 63.
53. Id. (emphasis added) (discussing study of fifty-six middle-income and low-income
nations, conducted by World Bank economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar).
54. U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks at World Summit on Sustainable
Development (Sept. 4, 2002) (on file with California Western International Law Journal).
55. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Global Development, Inter-American De-
velopment Bank (Mar. 14, 2002) (on file with California Western International Law Journal).
56. See PIERRE-RICHARD AGENOR, DOES GLOBALIZATION HURT THE POOR? 1 (World
Bank, Working Paper No. 2922, 2002).
57. Id.
58. Id.
Claims that the rich [countries] are the big winners from [trade] liberalisation ig-
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Foreign direct investment is arguably even more important as an engine
of global economic integration. But investment depends, in turn, on trade,
which is a prerequisite. Businesses build plants, bring in machinery, and
supply technology-all creating jobs-if they can trade their products.59
All three of these engines of economic development-trade, aid, and in-
vestment-depend on the rule of law,' and-often--on democracy6 and
nore the fact that their exports rose barely half as fast as developing countries' in
the 1990s. The real problem is the 50-odd very poor countries, which generate
only 0.4 per cent of world exports. Their plight is due to too little globalization, not
too much.
Trading Up, FIN. TIMES (1st ed., London), June 20, 2002, at 20. The anti-globalization activ-
ists' oft-leveled charge that world trade benefits the rich at the expense of the poor, and that
so-called "global inequality" is getting worse, has now been largely debunked. Karen Lowry
Miller, Is It Globaloney? NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 2002, at E4. A key source for that argument
was a 1999 U.N. report, which found a widening gap between increasingly rich countries and
increasingly poor ones. Id. But a recent, highly-acclaimed analysis found that weighting the
relevant data by the size of the national population (rather than, for example, treating Grenada
as the equivalent of China) shows dramatically rising living standards for both rich and poor.
While it is true that the gap is widening (that is, the rich are getting richer), the poor are also
getting richer-just not as quickly as the rich. See Convergence, Period, ECONOMIST, July 20,
2002, at 68 (discussing XAVIER SALA-i-MARTIN, THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8933, 2002)). In short, globalization has improved
everyone's lot.
59. A recent study documents the benefits to developing countries of investment by mul-
tinational corporations. Although certain potential problems are inherent, the study concludes
that the benefits of foreign direct investment generally greatly outweigh the costs. See
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING COSTS (2002).
According to the new study, the benefits of foreign direct investment to host countries in-
clude not only jobs, tax revenues and economic growth, but also "spillover benefits" such as
improvement of the quality of the local labor force and management skills, as well as the in-
troduction of new technology and the transfer of technical know-how. Id. The study disputes
the anti-globalizationists' claim that multinational corporations move production to develop-
ing countries to avoid stringent labor and environmental standards. According to the study,
foreign-owned enterprises operating in developing countries typically pay higher wages and
take their higher environmental standards with them when they invest. Id.
The report concedes that foreign direct investment can result in some unintended side ef-
fects, including competition with local firms; job losses at those firms; and volatility in the
balance of payments, related to the import and export activities of major investors. Id. But the
report also notes that such problems are generally temporary, and can be mitigated by appro-
priate host country policies. Id.
60. In defining "the rule of law," scholars and practitioners often resort to Lon Fuller's
list of the virtues inherent in a true system of law: (1) the law is general in its application; (2)
the law is public; (3) the law operates prospectively; (4) the law is reasonably clear; (5) the
law is internally consistent; (6) the law is practicable to comply with; (7) the law is relatively
stable; and (8) there is a congruence between the letter of the law and the way in which it is
enforced. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-41 (rev. ed. 1969).
61. As Winston Churchill famously quipped, "[Diemocracy is the worst form of gov-
ernment, except for all those other[s] that have been tried from time to time." Winston Chur-
chill, Address to the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in THE IRREPRESSIBLE CHURCILL
236 (Kay Halle ed., 1966). According to a recent report by the U.N. Development Pro-
gramme, the world is more democratic than ever before in history, with 140 countries holding
multiparty elections. See Democracy-Building Stalls, U.N. Report Says, WASH. POST, July 25,
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free market principles62 as well (what one writer has termed the "trinity ...
underpin[ning] liberal capitalism").63
John Davies, the Attorney General of Ireland in the early 1600's said:
"The first and principal cause of making kings was to maintain property and
contracts, and traffic and commerce among men."' In today's complex
world, the rule of law is all the more important to those ends. Kofi Annan
has underscored the point: "Without good governance, without the rule of
law, predictable administration, legitimate power, and responsive regula-
tion-no amount of funding, no short-term economic miracle will set the de-
veloping world on the path to prosperity."'65 Capital is fundamentally a cow-
2002, at A17 (discussing SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR ET AL., DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A
FRAGMENTED WORLD (U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Dev. Rep., 2002)). However, only 82
of the nearly 200 countries studied are considered full democracies. Id.
For more on the subject, see Phoney Democracies, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2000, at 20 (not-
ing that-for the first time in history-the proportion of the world's population living in
countries that can claim to be broadly democratic is greater than 50%, but arguing that a sig-
nificant number of those countries are "imposters" masquerading as democracies in order "to
gain just enough respectability to attract private foreign capital, and to qualify more readily
for the public sort, from multilateral bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank.").
One picture is worth a thousand words. A cartoon in The New Yorker depicts a woman
quizzing a gentleman at a cocktail party: "Has there ever been a country that had the word
'Democratic' in its name that was?" THE NEW YORKER, June 2, 1997, at 72. A case in point is
the old communist dictatorship in the former East Germany, which called its country the
German Democratic Republic ("the GDR"). That use of "democratic" so infuriated anti-
communists in West Germany that they routinely added "so-called" to the name of the GDR.
(In German, that would be the sogenannte Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or sogenannte
DDR for short). E.J. Dionne, Jr., Chattering Class: Sticks and Stones, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
1998, (Magazine), at 6.
62. In Eat the Rich, author and humorist P.J. O'Rourke offered up his own unique take
on the relative merits of the capitalist system: "The free market is ugly and stupid, like going
to the mall; the unfree market is just as ugly and just as stupid, except there's nothing in the
mall and if you don't go there they shoot you." John Leo, You Can Say That Again, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1999, at 18 (quoting P.J. O'ROURKE, EAT THE RICH (1998)).
Although a detailed discussion of the relationship between the free market economics and
the rule of law is beyond the scope of this essay, that relationship is well established. See, e.g.,
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar. - Apr. 1998, at 95 [hereinaf-
ter The Rule of Law Revival].
Basic elements of a modem market economy such as property rights and contracts
are founded on the law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without
the rule of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor
unions would not function, and the government's many involvements in the econ-
omy.., would be unfair, inefficient, and opaque.
Id.
63. Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the
Periphery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 79 (1999).
64. 0. Lee Reed, Law, The Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private
Market and Business Study, 38 AM. Bus. L. J. 441 (2001).
65. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address to the United Nations Association of
Canada (Dec. 3, 1997), quoted in Carlos Santiso, Promoting Democratic Governance and
Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme in Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 34 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 555, 555 (2002).
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ard. More than anything, international trade and foreign investment require
legal certainty-precisely what so many developing countries lack.66
Indonesia is a case in point. A recent Washington Post analysis high-
lighted the connection between the absence of the rule of law and the flight
of investment capital from that country:
[T]he poverty of Indonesia's legal system is a major part of why [inves-
tors] are staying away. It has contributed to a general lack of confidence
that is draining away badly needed capital and undermining the country's
struggle to recover from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.
Foreign investors complain they are subject to the arbitrary demands of
government officials, tax collectors and local partners. They have little
meaningful recourse in the courts, where bribery is rampant and favoritism
the legal standard.
Domestic and foreign businessmen alike also complain that judges rou-
tinely fail to enforce contracts .... "Investors in Indonesia doubt whether
their rights will be preserved and about the sanctity of contracts," said
Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international economic law at the
66. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has been an ardent and plain-spoken advocate
for the rule of law in the developing world, emphasizing that it is a prerequisite for interna-
tional trade and foreign investment. In one recent speech, he explained:
Markets need good government, functioning institutions, transparent policy-
making, and above all the rule of law. Capital is a coward; money flees uncertainty
and corruption. To entice capital in and then keep it in, governments must recog-
nize private property rights, deeds of trust, and the sanctity of contract, and they
must enforce these rights transparently and fairly.
I have made this point to every foreign minister, trade minister, prime minister or
president who has come to see me from an underdeveloped country. We sit in my
office and I [say], "Look, I got a dollar bill. I want to invest it somewhere where
it's going to be safe.... And I'm not going to send it to some place where there is
no rule of law, where if I had a problem. . . there is no court I can take it to, there
is no justice. I am not going to invest it in a place where corruption is ram-
pant .... "
"And so [Secretary Powell tells the visiting dignitaries] if you want to be a part of
this game, you've got to have the rule of law, you've got to understand contract
rules of law, you've got to eliminate corruption, you have to have political free-
dom, you have to have economic freedom.... And unless you're going to move in
this direction, you will discover that you may be able to get an occasional grant,
you might even get some help from the World Bank and the IMF, but you're not
going to get the private investment that you really need.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks to National Association of Manufacturers
(Oct. 31, 2001) (emphasis added) (on file with California Western International Law Journal).
See also O'Neill Stresses Targeting of Aid; Free Enterprise is Better Still, He Says, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2002, at E4 (quoting the then-U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, who stated that
potential entrepreneurs and investors in Africa "have no chance for success without govern-
ments that fairly enforce laws and contracts, respect human rights and property, and fight cor-
ruption."); Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 102,
106-07 (2001) (noting that "the absence of an established rule of law ... bode[s] badly for
foreign investment.").
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University of Indonesia. "The main thing is that Indonesia is no longer a
good place to invest."
For the first seven months of [2002], the amount of foreign direct invest-
ment approved by the Indonesian government declined 50 percent com-
pared with the same period in 2001, which itself showed a sharp decrease
rom a year earlier, according to the government's figures. In part this
stems from a global economic slowdown, rising labor costs and fears of
political instability. But investors say it's hard to overstate how the legal
problems of doing business here keep them away.
As a result, capital is leaving. According to the central bank, the country
suffered a net capital outflow [in 2001] of $5.7 billion. 67
In The Rule of Law Revival, a seminal essay published in Foreign Af-
fairs magazine a few years ago, Tom Carothers (of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace) identified three types of rule of law reform under-
taken in countries transitioning to democracy, distinguishing among them
based on the depth of reform.68 Type one reform focuses on rewriting laws,
particularly commercial and criminal law.69 Type two reform involves "the
strengthening of law-related institutions," through initiatives such as increas-
ing salaries for judges and court staff; training police, prosecutors, public de-
fenders, and prison staff; improving legal education; and strengthening legis-
latures and local government. Type three reform, in turn, "aim[s] at the
deeper goal of increasing government's compliance with the law"-the type
of reform most needed in Indonesia and in other emerging democracies
around the world.7'
As Carothers noted, rewriting constitutions, laws and regulations is rela-
tively easy, compared to the "heavy lifting" of institutional reform.72 Hardest
of all is type three reform because, to succeed, it must "get[ ] at the funda-
mental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law. 73 While "non-
state activities such as citizen-driven human rights and anti-corruption cam-
paigns can do much" to advance type three reform, "much of the impetus
must come [from inside government] from the top. 7 4 And, as Carothers ob-
served, "[e]ven the new generation of politicians arising out of the political
67. Alan Sipress, Flawed Legal System Impeding Indonesia, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2002,
at A17. Cf JOHN HEWKO, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: DOES THE RuLE OF LAW MATTER? 4-
5 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series Working Paper No. 26, 2002)
(concluding that "extensive overhaul of a [post-communist] country's legislative and institu-
tional framework is generally not a necessary precondition to attract direct investment" from
multinational corporations, and that the presence of foreign investment itself promotes and
encourages the rule of law).
68. The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 62 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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transitions of recent years are reluctant to support reforms that create com-
peting centers of authority beyond their control.""
Carothers noted that most governments attempting rule of law reform
are not going it alone, as funding for rule of law programs has become the
fastest-growing type of international aid.7" Government agencies, multilateral
institutions (particularly the development banks), foundations, universities
and human rights organizations from the U.S. and other Western countries
(most notably Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) are all getting
into the act, "descend[ing] on transitional societies with Western legal mod-
els in their briefcases.""
Carothers characterized the effects of this rule of law assistance as
"generally positive, though usually modest., 78 To date, most of the assistance
has been devoted to type one and type two reforms. Thus, "it has affected the
most important elements of the problem the least."M He concludes that
"[h]elping transitional economies achieve type three reform... is the hard-
est, slowest kind of assistance," requiring "a level of interventionism, politi-
cal attention, and visibility that many donor governments and organizations
cannot or do not wish to apply.""
Perhaps most chastening is Carothers' conclusion that "even large
amounts of [rule of law] aid will not bring rapid or decisive results," since
"[tihe primary obstacles to ... reform are not technical or financial, but po-
litical and human. ... [and] outside aid is no substitute for the will to reform,
which must come from within."'" Above all, he says, meaningful change re-
quires "patient, sustained attention, as breaking down entrenched political
interests, transforming values, and generating enlightened, consistent leader-







81. Id. See Semi-democracy, FIN. TIMEs (lst ed., U.S.), July 24, 2002, at 14 (asserting
that "[Tihe primary impulse for the attainment of democracy and good governance-and for
economic development-must come from within countries. The rest of the world can encour-
age that process. It cannot impose it.").
82. The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 62. Another Carnegie Endowment analyst,
Anatol Lieven, has observed:
[T]he creation and development of states is rarely a pretty sight. It usually involves
copious amounts of what Bismarck called blood and iron. This is true even in
western history if we go back a few centuries. It is even more the case with non-
western countries, many of which have been compelled to try to imitate western
success by adopting forms of state organization that may have no roots whatsoever
in local tradition.
Essentially, these countries are trying to jump to 21"-century Britain from the Brit-
ain of the 15" or even the 5" century in a few decades. It is hardly surprising that
so many make a mess of it, and that the process is so often bloody.
15
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Carothers' reference to rule of law consultants "with Western legal
models in their briefcases" calls to mind a true story from my work with one
rule of law organization a decade or so ago.83 The organization received an
unsolicited fax from a certain central European country, consisting of two
lines: How do we make stock exchange? Hurry response. The fax arrived on
a Friday afternoon, so there was much scurrying around; but, through a lot of
hard work, some volunteers had pulled together by Monday afternoon an
impressive "white paper" on securities markets and their regulation. The
white paper was promptly faxed off into cyberspace, and we all felt good
about ourselves-till we saw the incoming fax awaiting us Tuesday morn-
ing. "Thank you," the latest transmission read. "But how many desks? How
many chairs?"
There is another story of a high-ranking official in a developing country,
who eagerly accepted the bundles of fill-in-the blank constitutions and other
legal documents provided to him by earnest and well-intentioned rule of law
consultants. The official was privately asked by one of his colleagues
whether the documents were of any use. And the official confided that all the
documents were printed on just one side of the page, and paper was a pre-
cious commodity, so he willingly took all the documents the rule of law ad-
visors had to offer.8 ' Talk about a constitution being worth nothing more
than the paper on which it is printed!
The lesson to be learned here is that there are no "one size fits all" solu-
tions, and that we must abandon any notion that "America knows best."
There are fundamental differences between legal cultures around the world
on basic concepts such as fact-finding, precedent, and the roles of various
branches of government; and some other systems work at least as well as
that in place in the United States.85
We also do well to remember that the citizens of the U.S. haven't cor-
nered virtue.8" Many countries, for example, find the United States' espoused
Anatol Lieven, The World Is Still Made Out of Nations, FIN. TIMES (1st ed., London), Dec.
19, 2002, at 19.
83. Rule of Law Revival, supra note 62.
84. See generally Jacques DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance,
American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U.
PENN. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 179-80 (1999) (recounting similar anecdotes).
85. Tom Carothers has pointedly observed:
Americans frequently assume [the rule of law assistance they offer] is of para-
mount importance. They mistakenly believe that rule-of-law promotion is their
special province, although they are not alone in that. German and French jurists
also tend to view their country as the keeper of the flame of civil code reform.
British lawyers and judges point to the distinguished history of the British ap-
proach. Transitional countries are bombarded with fervent but contradictory advice
on judicial and legal reform.
The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 62.
86. When Mahatma Ghandi was once asked what he thought of western civilization, he
replied (only half in jest) that he thought it would be a "good idea." Mohandas K. Ghandi, in
16
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commitment to human rights and the rule of law difficult to reconcile with
its embrace of the death penalty.87 And tsome-here at home, and abroad-
THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS, No. 24377 (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 1996).
87. The U.S. has drawn intense fire for failing to fulfill its treaty obligations and flouting
the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a series of cases involving the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations. That convention, to which the U.S. is a party, re-
quires that law enforcement officials promptly inform any arrested foreign national of his or
her right to confer with consular representatives from his or her country. Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. In February 2003, the
ICJ issued a Provisional Measure ordering the United States to take "all measure necessary"
to stay the executions of three Mexican nationals on death row in Texas and Oklahoma, pend-
ing the ICJ's ruling on Mexico's claim that the three were detained in violation of the Vienna
Convention. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J.
No. 128, 59(a) (Provisional Measures of Feb. 5, 2003), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocketlimus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.PDF (last visited May 16,
2003).
The Mexico case is the third time in five years that U.S. compliance with the Vienna
Convention has been before the ICJ. The two prior cases involved Paraguay and its national,
Angel Breard, and Germany and its national, Walter LaGrand. See Case Concerning the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Apr. 9); LaGrand
Case (Germany v. U.S.) 1999 I.C.J. 28 (Mar. 5). In both of those cases, the ICJ issued orders
requiring the U.S. to temporarily stay the executions pending ICJ decisions on the merits; but,
in both cases, the men were executed by the states where they were being held. LaGrand Case
(Germany v. U.S.) 1999 No. 104, at 29(I)(a) (Mar. 3, 1999), at http://www.icj-cij.org; Case
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 99,
at 41(1), at http://www.icj-cij.org. What makes the Mexico case different is that the ICJ's
order requires that the U.S. take not just all measures at its disposal, but "all measures neces-
sary" to prevent the impending executions. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Na-
tionals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. No. 128, 59(a) (Provisional Measures of Feb. 5, 2003), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlimus/imusorder/imusiorder_20030205.PDF (last vis-
ited May 16, 2003). That wording is stronger than the language of previous orders, and is in-
tended to foreclose the United States' defense in prior cases-that the Executive Branch of
the federal government did all that it could to comply with the ICJ's orders but that, in a fed-
eral system, it could not force states to delay executions. Marcia Coyle, A Death Penalty
Duel, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 17, 2003, at Al.
Capital punishment puts the U.S. in rare company. The death penalty is now banned (ex-
cept in extraordinary cases, such as treason) in more than 100 countries around the globe.
Executions, THE EcONOMIST, June 10, 2000, at 21. Indeed, the U.S. is the sole Western de-
mocracy that retains the practice; India and Japan are the only other large democracies in the
world that have not abolished it. Id. And the U.S. finds itself in truly unsavory company when
the statistics on actual implementation of the death sentence are considered. In 2000, there
were 85 executions on American death rows, placing the U.S. third in the world, behind Saudi
Arabia (123) and ahead of Iran (75). Of Death's Dominion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
25, 2001, at 14.
Europeans, in particular, widely view the death penalty as "barbaric" and are baffled by
Americans' strong support for it. T.R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror Suspects to
U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23. See T.R. Reid, Many Europeans See Bush as Exe-
cutioner Extraordinaire, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at A36. The European Convention on
Human Rights prohibits the death penalty for any crime. Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Furthermore, European Union states refuse to "extra-
dite individuals to the U.S. unless they receive assurances [that] the death penalty will not be
applied." Judy Dempsey, Europeans Dismayed by US Go-It-Alone Approach to Justice, FIN.
TIMES (2d ed., London), Dec. 14, 2001, at 8.
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viewed the 2000 Presidential elections as a failure of the rule of law as
well."8
The next-and possibly greatest-challenges on the democratization
and rule of law front are Afghanistan and Iraq.89 And Tom Carothers and his
colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment have been cautious on this topic too,
disputing the notion that regime change will bring swift democracy to Iraq
and will, in turn, trigger a wave of democracy throughout the Middle East.9°
Writing on the eve of war, they warned:
It is hard not to be tantalized by the notion that with one hard blow in Iraq
the United States could unleash a tidal wave of democracy in a region long
gripped by intransigent autocracy. But although the United States can cer-
tainly oust Saddam Hussein and install a less repressive regime, Iraqi de-
mocracy will not be soon forthcoming.
In other countries where the United States has forcibly removed dictators
or engaged in nation building after civil wars, democracy has not flowered
readily. For example, the Bush administration's bold promise of democ-
ratic renewal for post-Taliban Afghanistan has yet to be fulfilled. The
government in Kabul is far from establishing control across the entire
country. Democracy building exercises such as the loya jirga have, thus
far, created only uneasy power sharing pacts among warlords.
Earlier attempts have often fared no better. In 1994, the United States
ousted a dictatorial regime in Haiti and afterwards attempted to build de-
mocracy. But what has emerged is political chaos, renewed repression and
dismal U.S.-Haiti relations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, interna-
tional administrators have been given tremendous legal powers and finan-
cial resources, and been charged with the task of building stable, ethni-
cally inclusive democracies. But more than six years later in Bosnia and
almost four in Kosovo, both areas would likely lapse into renewed ethnic
violence if international forces pulled out.
88. Hendrik Hertzberg, 2000 and Two, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 4, 2002, at 43. Hertz-
berg characterized the 2000 election as a "travesty," yielding a President chosen not by the
people, but:
by the five most conservative Justices of the Supreme Court, in a decision so
shoddily reasoned and so at odds with their normal jurisprudential inclinations that
the only plausible explanation ... is that they were simply imposing their political
preference.
Id. Hertzberg's article was a review of The Longest Night: Polemics and Perspectives on
Election 2000, a published collection of essays by two dozen scholars of law and history, in-
cluding Shlomo Avineri of Jerusalem's Hebrew University, who pointedly observed: "Cer-
tainly there is no other democratic society [than the United States) in which an executive
president can be elected if he receives fewer popular votes than his major contender." Id.
89. See, e.g., GuY DINMORE & JOSHUA CHAFFIN, U.S. Sets Out its Blueprint for Task of
Rebuilding, FIN. TnMEs (2d ed., London), Mar. 12, 2003, at 3 (discussing U.S.'s announce-
ment of nation-building plans for Iraq, reflecting "a determination by the Bush administration
to be in full control of Iraq-at least in the initial stages-to a degree that the US has not ex-
ercised beyond its shores since the aftermath of the second world war.").
90. Thomas Carothers & Bethany Lacina, Quick Transformation to Democratic Middle
East is Fantasy, SEA-TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16,2003, at El.
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Panama, where the United States removed General Manuel Noriega from
power in 1990, has achieved some degree of democratic government. But
Panama had some genuine experience with pluralism before Noriega rose
to power and Panamanian politics today, though not dictatorial, are still
mired in corruption, public disillusionment and fecklessness.
In all these countries, post-invasion politics have come to closely resemble
those that prevailed before the toppled regime took power. Iraq before
Saddam Hussein was conflict-ridden and authoritarian. And Iraq, like Af-
ghanistan, is a nation challenged by profound ideological, religious, re-
gional and ethnic divisions.
All this does not mean that Iraq can never become democratic. But the
idea of a quick and easy democratic transformation is a fantasy. The
United States would have to stay engaged in the country over many years,
both providing security forces to keep the country intact and helping to
maintain the momentum and integrity of new political structures....
As difficult as creating a democratic Iraq would likely be, it is even more
doubtful that ousting Saddam Hussein would trigger a wave of democracy
throughout the rest of the Middle East. The most likely political effects of
war would be a surge in the already burgeoning anti-Americanism in the
region. This would strengthen the hand of Islamist opposition forces in
many Arab countries, which in turn would impel governments in those
countries to restrict what little political space exists, out of fear of political
unrest that could get out of hand. The net effect therefore would likely be
even less political reform and freedom in the region rather than more.
Carothers and his co-author concluded:
The United States should promote democracy in the Middle East. But it
must recognize that rapid transformation is unlikely. U.S. goals must be
initially modest, and our commitment to change must be long term. The
core elements of a democracy-oriented policy are not hard to identify. The
U.S. government should exert sustained, high-level pressure on Arab
states to respect political and civil rights, to create or expand the space for
political debate and to carry out pro-democratic institutional, legal and
constitutional changes. This pressure should be coupled with increased aid
to bolster democracy activists and reform advocates, political parties, rule
of law reforms and civil society groups, including moderate Islamists.
The United States has limited leverage in most Arab countries. ... [It] will
be forced to work with existing regimes toward gradual reform. It will also
be forced.. . to struggle with substantial obstacles to building a democ-
ratic Iraq. No one should expect a wave of democratization in the Middle
East in the near term. And no one should expect that toppling Saddam
Hussein would create one.9 2
91. Id. See also MARINA OTTAWAY ET AL., DEMOCRATIC MIRAGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Policy Brief No. 20, Oct. 2002) (amplifying the themes
of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer op-ed).
92. Carothers & Lacina, supra note 90, at El. See also OTTAWAY, supra note 91.
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If Carothers and his colleagues are on the mark, it will be time and pa-
tience-and not oil-that will be the most important resources in Iraq in the
months and years that lie ahead.
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